Introduction
Many economic problems are characterized by externalities across agents at the national and international level. Examples include imperfect competition, research and development with imperfect appropriation of research output, international trade, contagious diseases, international terrorism and transboundary pollution (Arce and Sandler 2004) . It is wellknown that in the presence of externalities cooperation between agents can improve upon uncoordinated action. As shown for instance in Bloch (2003) and Yi (1997) self-enforcing cooperation proves easy (difficult) in the context of negative (positive) externalities from cooperation. If the enlargement of coalitions has a negative impact on outsiders, there are strong incentives to participate in cooperation and typically the grand coalition forms. The opposite is true for a positive impact, which applies to many examples of pure and impure public good provision. Then free-riding is encouraged and the formation of large and effective self-enforcing agreements proves difficult. Prominent and well-studied examples in the literature are international environmental agreements (IEAs). 1 The difficulties of establishing effective global cooperation are underlined by the current efforts of negotiating a Post-Kyoto Protocol. Na and Shin (1998) point out that two issues have received little attention: a) the role of asymmetry and b) the role of uncertainty. They construct a public good model of coalition formation with three players. Players are symmetric with respect to abatement costs from individual abatement but receive different benefits from global abatement. Differences are due to different realizations of an individual benefit parameter. They show that if decisions are taken after uncertainty about the parameters is resolved, the grand coalition comprising all three players is never stable: the outcome of the game is either a two-player coalition or complete non-cooperation, depending on the degree of heterogeneity of the benefit 1 The literature dates back to Barrett (1994) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992) and is surveyed for instance in Barrett (2003) and Finus (2003 Finus ( , 2008 .
parameters. They contrast this case of full learning, which they call ex-post negotiations, with the case of no learning, which they call ex-ante negotiations. In the latter case, under the assumption of ex-ante symmetric expectations about the realization of the uncertain benefit parameters, they show that the grand coalition is stable. The coalitional equilibria under the two models of learning are compared from an ex-ante perspective. It is shown that the expected total payoff over all players under learning is lower than under no learning. This leads to the conclusion that the veil of uncertainty (a term coined by Brennan and Buchanan 1985) is conducive to the success of self-enforcing cooperation. Later papers with slightly different models have confirmed this conclusion (Kolstad 2007 and Kolstad and Ulph 2008 ).
Considering the model of Na and Shin (1998) one wonders which are the crucial assumptions that drive results, how general they are and whether there is a way to avoid this negative outcome. One extension which we rule out from the outset is to consider a different payoff function. Though Na and Shin's payoff function is simple (linear benefits from global abatement and quadratic costs from individual abatement), it captures the main driving forces. The evaluation of the success of coalition formation requires the consideration of a particular function anyway and more complicated functions would make analytical solutions difficult to obtain in the context of uncertainty. However, we also do not find it attractive to switch to the simpler payoff function with linear benefit and cost functions considered for instance in Kolstad (2007) and Ulph (2008, 2009 ) as this leads to corner solutions in terms of equilibrium abatement choices, irrespective of the type of uncertainty.
The most obvious extension is to allow for any number of players instead of only three players. For more than three players, even under no learning the grand coalition will not necessarily form. Consequently, strategic interaction between coalition members and nonmembers will be present when choosing abatement levels.
The second extension is inspired by the work of Kolstad (2007) , and Ulph (2008, 2009) The third and fourth extensions are motivated by the suspicion that asymmetry may be a crucial factor that leads to small coalitions under full learning. As we show in more detail below, Na and Shin's assumption implies that there is pure uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits from global abatement, but the aggregate level of benefits is known.
Hence, the third extension looks at the other extreme case, namely pure uncertainty about the level of benefits with symmetric realizations of the benefit parameters. This is what Kolstad (2007) calls systematic uncertainty. We consider a general version of this assumption in the context of Na and Shin's model. In contrast, the fourth extension sticks to pure uncertainty about the distribution of benefits but considers transfers to mitigate the asymmetric distribution of the gains from cooperation. Both extensions (third and fourth) qualify the negative conclusion about the role of learning. Interestingly, it turns out that with transfers asymmetry becomes even an asset.
2
We stick to the terminology "partial learning" in order to relate our work to the literature on IEAs and uncertainty.
Finally, the fifth extension considers a mirror image of the Na and Shin (1998) model: pure uncertainty about the distribution of the costs from individual abatement, instead of uncertainty about the benefits from global abatement. Again, it turns out that the negative role of learning has to be qualified. For all extensions, we identify three effects (information, strategic and distributional effect) which help to explain the role of learning.
In the following, we outline our model in section 2. Section 3 analyzes the outcome under the various extensions. Section 4 summarizes the main conclusions and proposes some issues for future research.
Model

Coalition Formation
Consider as in Na and Shin (1998) and in many other models on IEAs that countries decide in the first stage whether to join an agreement (in which case they are called signatories) or to remain an outsider as a singleton (in which case they are called non-signatories).
Players' membership decisions lead to a coalition structure, { , } n m K S 1 which is a partition of players, with n being the total number of players (without restriction to n 3 as in Na and Shin) , m the size of coalition S , m n d , and N the set of players, S N . In this simple coalition formation game, coalition structure K is entirely determined by coalition S .
In the second stage, given that some coalition S has formed in the first stage, players choose their abatement levels i y . For a start, assume no uncertainty and that as in Na and Shin (1998) the decision is based on the following payoff function:
where i b is the parameter of the benefit function from global abatement (in the form of reduced damages, e.g. measured against some business-as-usual-scenario) and i c the parameter of the cost function from individual abatement. Both parameters are assumed to be strictly positive.
For signatories it is assumed that they derive their equilibrium abatement levels by maximizing the aggregate payoff to their coalition 
The reason is that the singleton coalition structure can be generated by S , i.e. all players announce not to join the agreement. Then if one player changes her announcement, such that { } S i , the coalition structure remains the same. 
Proof: From the F.O.C. in (2) it is evident that if country j joins coalition S , such that Ŝ forms, it will choose a higher abatement level, as well as all signatories of S , but all remaining non-signatories' abatement levels remain constant. Hence, total abatement will be higher if Ŝ than if S forms (GEC with respect to abatement). Moreover, countries which are neither signatories of S nor of Ŝ will have higher benefits but the same costs and hence higher payoffs (PE). SAD follows from max . max . as a singleton) which corresponds to the social optimum (Nash equilibrium). Note that the property GEC also holds under uncertainty, which we consider later by taking expectations over the uncertain parameters. This will be useful when evaluating the success under the three models of learning below. The Positive Externality (PE) explains why the formation of large stable coalition is difficult, despite Superadditivity (SAD) holds. Starting from no cooperation and forming gradually large coalitions, the SAD-effect is gradually outweighted by the PE-effect. Again, these effects are also present under uncertainty.
Learning Scenarios
We now assume that some parameter values of the payoff functions are uncertain.
Following Na and Shin (1998) and many other papers, we assume risk-neutral agents as players are governments and not individuals. Additional to Na and Shin (1998) and as in Ulph (2008, 2009) , we also consider the scenario of partial learning, which gives rise to the following three learning scenarios: 1) full learning, 2) partial learning and 3) no learning. Full Learning (abbreviated FL) can be considered as a benchmark case in which players learn about the true parameter values before taking the membership decision in the first stage. Hence, uncertainty is fully resolved at the beginning of the game. For Partial Learning (abbreviated PL) it is assumed that players decide about membership under uncertainty but know that they will learn about the true parameter values before deciding upon abatement levels in the second stage. Hence, the membership decision is based on expected payoffs, under the assumption that players will take the correct decision in the second stage. Finally, under No Learning (abbreviated NL) also the abatement decision has to be taken under uncertainty. That is, players derive their abatement strategies by maximizing expected payoffs. The membership decisions are also taken based on expected payoffs, though these payoffs differ from those under partial learning, given that less information is available.
Thus, viewed together, uncertainty is symmetric: all players know as much or little than their fellow players. FL and PL are identical regarding the second stage. Hence, differences and similarities between these two learning scenarios in terms of overall outcomes must be related to the first stage. Both scenarios differ from NL as abatement decisions under NL are based on expected payoffs. All three scenarios differ with respect to the first stage. The determination of stable coalitions is based on known payoffs under FL, expected payoffs given that abatement decision will be based on realized parameter values under PL and expected payoffs based on expected parameter values under NL.
In the following, we analyze four cases. Case 1 is the Na and Shin (1998) 
Results
Case 1: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits without Transfers
Na and Shin's case requires assuming cost symmetry and hence we set We also adopt a uniform distribution, but as we consider an indefinite number of players, we have to define a specific set of benefit parameter values over the set of players. Hence, we assume the following probability distribution: For FL and PL, equilibrium abatement levels of the second stage follow directly from (2) and ( Before proceeding to the first stage, it is already informative to compare second stage outcomes. For this, we take an ex-ante perspective and compute equilibrium expected abatement and payoff levels also in the case of FL and PL. Note that there is an immediate link between individual and total expected levels: individual levels are a fraction n of total levels. This is due to the ex-ante symmetry of all countries -they do not know whether they will be signatories or non-signatories. Thus, in the following analysis and proofs, we concentrate on total expected levels. It is clear that FL and PL are identical as there are no differences in the second stage. With respect to abatement, there is also no difference to NL. This suggests that despite there is over-and undershooting in terms of optimal abatement levels under NL, compared to the realizations of the random benefit parameter i 4 , on average this cancels out. This is different for payoffs.
Consider first the grand coalition, S N , corresponding to the social optimum. Then there is no strategic interaction between players. We call the payoff difference between learning and no learning in the grand coalition the information effect from learning. In other words, the information effect measures the value of information in the absence of any strategic interaction and stability considerations. A priori we know that this information effect cannot be negative -it can only be zero at worst. For S N the first order conditions require setting the sum of marginal benefits over all players equal to individual marginal abatement costs. By assumption, in case 1, also under NL the sum of marginal benefits is known. Hence, the information effect from learning is zero.
Consider now any other coalitions structure different from the grand coalition S N z where there is interaction between players. We call the payoff difference between learning and no learning in these coalition structures the strategic effect from learning. This effect is negative according to Lemma 2. In order to explore the intuition behind this result, let us take the extreme case where no non-trivial coalition forms, which corresponds to the Nash 4 , all countries choose the same abatement level which is also inefficient as under FL and PL (i.e. marginal abatement costs are not set equal to the sum of marginal benefits), but at least cost-effective (i.e. all marginal abatement costs are equal). Thus, the negative strategic effect from learning is a cost-effectiveness effect here. Put differently, getting it on average right across all players in terms of costs is more important than getting it individually right.
We now move to the first stage and determine stable coalitions. In order to make coalition formation interesting, we assume henceforth n 3 t . We find: The idea is illustrated for two players in an emission game in Ulph (1998) . Other examples with negative value of information in non-cooperative equilibria are discussed for instance in Gollier and Treich (2003 If n 4 t , only the two countries with the highest benefit parameter find it attractive to form a coalition.
The driving force of this result is what we call the distributional effect from learning: the payoff difference of various degrees of learning due to the stability of different coalitions.
The intuition is along the lines of Young (1994) , borrowing the concept of the veil of uncertainty from Brennan and Buchanan (1985) , who argues that agreements are easier if potential participants do not know the distributional consequences. 6 Since stable coalitions depend on second stage outcomes, it is generally difficult to disentangle the distributional from the strategic effect. However, this poses no problem when FL and PL are compared as second stage outcomes are identical: it is the payoff difference between FL and PL due to different coalition sizes, resulting from different distributions of the gains from cooperation among coalition members.
Hence, compared to Na and Shin (1998), we also confirm for PL the stable coalition size of 3, but this is not the grand coalition as long as there are more than three countries. Like in Na and Shin (1998) the coalition size under FL falls short of the coalition size under NL, and, as just confirmed, also under PL.
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Note that similar small coalitions are obtained for other strictly concave payoff functions as long as one does not assume Stackelberg leadership of signatories (see Finus 2003) .
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The idea is also illustrated in a simple two-player model in Helm (1998) and in Kolstad (2005) .
We now combine the first and second stage outcomes to evaluate the overall success of IEAs. 
Case 2: Uncertainty about the Level of Benefits
3 * FL * PL * NL E m E m E m ª º ª º ª º ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ .
Proof
Case 3: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits with Transfers
Another possibility to avoid the negative outcome of case 1 is transfers. Transfers can address the negative distributional effect from learning. They are relevant for FL, but have no effect on PL and NL as membership decisions are based on expected payoffs which are symmetric among signatories and also among all non-signatories. Therefore, transfers will affect the ranking between FL and PL, FL and NL, but not the ranking between PL and NL.
More precisely, the analysis proceeds as follows. First, note that the maximization procedure in the second stage (see (2) and (3) those with the highest aggregate welfare over all players (optimality). This property hinges on only one structural property, namely the (weakly) positive externality (PE) from coalition formation. As known from Lemma 1, this property holds even in its strong version in our coalition formation game. Applying AISS to our setting, we derive the following result.
Lemma 6: Equilibrium Coalitions in the First Stage in Case 3
In case 3, under the three scenarios of learning, the expected equilibrium coalition size
is given by:
where under FL all possible 3-player coalitions are stable if 8 d n , no stable coalition comprises less than three players if 9 n t and ( ) f n increases in n .
Proof: See Appendix 2. (Q.E.D.)
As pointed out above, the outcomes of PL and NL are not affected by transfers. The coalition size under FL does no longer fall short of those under PL and NL. To the contrary, if n is large enough (i.e. n 9 t ), the coalition size will be larger than under PL and NL. Due to the assumption about the distribution of the variables i 4 , the degree of asymmetry among players (measured as the variance of the elements of the vector 4 ) increases with the number of players n . This asymmetry is conducive to the size of stable coalitions if accompanied by an appropriate transfer scheme. The intuition is the following.
Cooperation among some players compared to the non-cooperative status quo typically serves two purposes. First, internalizing an externality among coalition members by choosing higher abatement levels than under no cooperation. This is a benefit every coalition member enjoys and, in fact, also non-signatories, as exemplified by the property PE (see Lemma 1). Second, equalizing marginal abatement costs across coalition members and hence reaping the gains from cost-effectiveness. This is an exclusive benefit only the coalition enjoys as a group that does not spread to non-signatories. This is captured by the property superadditivity (see Lemma 1). This exclusive benefit is higher for heterogeneous than for symmetric players. It is particularly pronounced here as without cooperation payoffs would be very low: the Nash equilibrium would be particularly inefficient as marginal abatement costs differ between players under FL (as they do under PL). Taken together, compared to case 1, under FL, transfers reduce the negative distributional effect from learning or may even transform it into a positive effect. Overall, this leads to the following result.
Proposition 3: Outcome in Case 3 (Uncertainty about the Distribution of Benefits with Transfers)
In case 3, under the full, partial, and no learning scenario, expected equilibrium total abatement levels and expected total payoffs are ranked as follows: 
Proof:
The ranking between PL and NL follows from Proposition 2 as transfers have no effect. The ranking between PL and FL follows from the same second stage outcomes (Lemma 2), the same or different first stage outcomes (depending on n ) as given in Lemma 6 and applying property GEC (Lemma 1). The ranking between FL and NL is established in three steps.
Step 1: For total abatement, we combine second stage outcomes in Lemma 2, first stage outcomes in Lemma 6 and apply property GEC.
Step 2: For n 3 and 4 n 8 d d , the same reasoning as in step 1 applies for the relation between total payoffs under FL and NL.
Step 3: For n 9 t , NL produces better second stage outcomes than FL (Lemma 2), but FL produces larger stable coalitions (Lemma 6). Hence, under FL, for each n 9, t we consider all possible T -vectors and compute the expected total payoff over all Pareto-undominated stable coalitions. 7 Then, we compare this to the expected total payoff under NL with 3
Taken together, the ranking between FL and NL, as established by Na and Shin (1998) and which is our case 1, changes with transfers if the degree of asymmetry between players is large enough. Then the veil of uncertainty is no longer conducive to cooperation but has a negative impact. Thus, transfers may be seen as a successful safety valve or hedging strategy in the presence of uncertainty about the distribution of benefits.
Case 4: Uncertainty about the Distribution of Costs
In this final section, we consider a mirror image of Na and Shin's case ( 
Summary and Conclusions
The starting point of our analysis was the negative conclusion of Na and Shin (1998) about the value of information in a public good game of coalition formation. We addressed two general questions. How general is this result? What are the driving forces? The first question was analyzed by pointing out that in Na and Shin (1998) uncertainty is symmetric and about the parameters of the payoff functions. In particular, uncertainty is about the distribution of the benefits from the provision of the public good "global abatement" with exante symmetric expectations but ex-post asymmetric realizations of the benefit parameter.
We confirmed Na and Shin's negative result in a more general setting which allowed for any number of players and considered not only the learning scenarios no and full learning, but also the intermediate scenario partial learning. In a two-stage coalition formation game, no learning means that players never learn the true parameter values, partial learning that they find out about them after the first (membership decision) but before the second stage (abatement decision), and full learning that they know them before the first stage. We denoted this setting case 1. This was contrasted with cases 2, 3 and 4. Case 2 did not focus on uncertainty about the distribution but the level of the benefits from public good provision. Case 3 stuck to uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits but introduced a transfer scheme to balance asymmetric gains from cooperation among coalition members. Case 4 was the mirror image of case 1 and considered uncertainty about the distribution of the costs of public good provision. For completeness, this was done not only without but also with transfers.
It became apparent that a departure from Na and Shin's setting leads to more positive results about the role of learning. In case 2 the value of information is always positive, when comparing full or partial learning with no learning. In case 3, the negative value of information of case 1 could be partly mitigated. Transfers left no and partial learning unaffected but improved upon full learning. The larger the asymmetries among players, in the form of different realizations of the benefit parameter, the larger are the gains from cooperation which can now be fully reaped through a transfer scheme. In other words, diversity becomes an asset if accompanied by an appropriate transfer scheme. Also in case 4, the mirror image of case 1, which assumed uncertainty about the distribution of the costs, the negative effect of learning was less pronounced and was clearly positive with transfers.
In all four cases, three main effects (though to a different extent and with different signs)
were at work, called the information, strategic and distribution effect. The information effect basically means that, in the absence of strategic interaction, i.e. when the grand coalition forms, more information cannot decrease the expected aggregate payoff. The strategic effect refers to the impact of learning on expected payoffs for all coalition structures where there is strategic interaction between players, i.e. the grand coalition does not form. We showed that in Na and Shin's setting this strategic effect from learning is negative such that full and partial learning rank worse than no learning in terms of expected payoffs. Finally, once stability of coalitions is considered, the distribution of the gains from cooperation among coalition members becomes an issue. In Na and Shin's setting this distributional effect from learning is negative under full learning. Asymmetry of the benefit parameter translates into asymmetry of the gains from cooperation, upsetting large stable coalition.
With transfers, however, this asymmetries can be balanced. The distributional effect may become even positive -leading to larger stable coalitions than under no and partial learning -as the aggregate gains from cooperation to coalition members increase with diversity.
Taken together, our results suggest that the veil of uncertainty may be good if the uncertainty about the distribution is larger than about the level of the gains from cooperation. This is particularly true if the distribution of the gains from cooperation is more asymmetric ex-post than ex-ante expected. For such cases, a transfer scheme is helpful which hedges against possible asymmetries. Since asymmetries are the result of diversity, and diversity allows for larger comparative advantages from cooperation, transfers may even turn an apparent disadvantage into an advantage. Moreover, it appears that Na and Shin's setting of pure uncertainty about the distribution of the benefits from the provision of a public good is an interesting but also a special assumption. For many economic problems, uncertainty about the level of the benefits as well as uncertainty about the costs of public good provision will be important too. In such cases the positive effect of the veil of uncertainty is less evident from our model which is certainly a relief to all those that believe that learning should be beneficial.
